Folk beliefs about genetic variation predict avoidance of biracial individuals by Sonia K. Kang et al.
ORIGINAL RESEARCH
published: 07 April 2015
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00357
Edited by:
Marcel Zentner,
University of Innsbruck, Austria
Reviewed by:
Mark Hallahan,
College of the Holy Cross, USA
Kenneth G. DeMarree,
University at Buffalo, USA
Susan K. Fenstermacher,
University of Vermont, USA
*Correspondence:
Sonia K. Kang,
Rotman School of Management,
University of Toronto, Toronto,
ON M5S 3E6, Canada; Institute for
Management and Innovation,
University of Toronto Mississauga,
Mississauga, ON M5S 3E6, Canada
sonia.kang@rotman.utoronto.ca
Specialty section:
This article was submitted to
Personality and Social Psychology,
a section of the journal
Frontiers in Psychology.
Received: 15 December 2014
Accepted: 13 March 2015
Published: 07 April 2015
Citation:
Kang SK, Plaks JE and Remedios JD
(2015) Folk beliefs about genetic
variation predict avoidance of biracial
individuals.
Front. Psychol. 6:357.
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2015.00357
Folk beliefs about genetic variation
predict avoidance of biracial
individuals
Sonia K. Kang1,2*, Jason E. Plaks3 and Jessica D. Remedios4
1 Institute for Management and Innovation, University of Toronto Mississauga, Mississauga, ON, Canada, 2 Rotman School of
Management, University of Toronto, Toronto, ON, Canada, 3 Department of Psychology, University of Toronto, Toronto, ON,
Canada, 4 Department of Psychology, Tufts University, Medford, MA, USA
People give widely varying estimates for the amount of genetic overlap that exists
between humans. While some laypeople believe that humans are highly genetically
similar to one another, others believe that humans share very little genetic overlap.
These studies examine how beliefs about genetic overlap affect neural and evaluative
reactions to racially-ambiguous and biracial targets. In Study 1, we found that lower
genetic overlap estimates predicted a stronger neural avoidance response to biracial
compared to monoracial targets. In Study 2, we found that lower genetic overlap
estimates predicted longer response times to classify biracial (vs. monoracial) faces into
racial categories. In Study 3, we manipulated genetic overlap beliefs and found that
participants in the low overlap condition explicitly rated biracial targets more negatively
than those in the high overlap condition. Taken together, these data suggest that genetic
overlap beliefs influence perceivers’ processing fluency and evaluation of biracial and
racially-ambiguous individuals.
Keywords: automatic/implicit processes, categorization, lay theories, person perception, social neuroscience
Introduction
In general, perceivers view racial categories as natural kinds whose members share a deep, under-
lying essence that governs a range of visible (e.g., skin tone) and invisible (e.g., intelligence) traits
(Medin and Ortony, 1989; Yzerbyt et al., 2001; Haslam and Whelan, 2008). An essentialist view of
race is associated with the belief that racial categories are good predictors of personality and behav-
ior (Rothbart and Taylor, 1992; Yzerbyt et al., 2001). As such, essentialist beliefs have been found to
predict racial stereotyping and prejudice (McGarty et al., 2002; Keller, 2005; Bastian and Haslam,
2006; Condit, 2008; Williams and Eberhardt, 2008; Chao et al., 2013).
Surprisingly little research, however, has investigated how exactly people mentally represent
the biological roots of essence. What—according to laypeople—creates a racial essence? A likely
candidate is genes. In the present studies, we examined people’s underlying assumptions about the
relationship between genetic variation and race.
Recent evidence suggests that people generally consider between-group diﬀerences that are
ascribable to genetic factors to be more signiﬁcant and immutable than diﬀerences rooted in social
or environmental factors (Dar-Nimrod andHeine, 2006; Schnittker, 2008;Williams and Eberhardt,
2008; Dar-Nimrod and Heine, 2011). But what precisely do people believe about variation in the
human genome within and between common race categories like “Black,” “White,” or “Asian”?
How much individual variation is there in such beliefs? And how, if at all, might variation in
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beliefs about human genetic overlap aﬀect perceivers’ evalua-
tions of biracial people, who straddle the boundaries between
categories?
While evidence from the Human Genome Project suggests
that humans, regardless of race, share 99.9% of their genetic
material (Feldman et al., 2003; Ossorio and Duster, 2005), recent
studies demonstrate that laypeople give widely varying estimates
of the percentage of genetic material that humans share (with a
mean of ∼68%; Plaks et al., 2012). These varying estimates have
behavioral consequences. For example, Plaks et al. (2012) demon-
strated that the lower the estimate of intergroup genetic overlap,
the greater the tendency to visually perceive discrete (“either/or”)
boundaries between races. In other words, beliefs guided percep-
tion: a stronger a priori belief in discrete (genetically-based) cat-
egories predicted a stronger tendency to perceive a continuously-
varying array of morphed faces as conforming to two discrete
categories.
In the current work, we extend these ﬁndings by focussing
speciﬁcally on how people react to faces in the middle of this con-
tinuous array—the blended, biracial faces that are most racially-
ambiguous. Here, we aim to gain a more speciﬁc understanding
of (a) whether beliefs about genetic overlap inﬂuence perceivers’
evaluations of ambiguous faces, and (b) what mechanisms may
begin to explain any diﬀerences in evaluation. We do so by using
a neural measure of avoidance (Study 1), a behavioral measure of
processing disﬂuency (Study 2), and an explicit measure of trait
judgments (Study 3).
The Case of Biracial Target Persons
We theorized that biracial targets pose a unique perceptual and
conceptual challenge because they are more likely than others to
be racially-ambiguous, making them diﬃcult to categorize dis-
cretely (Remedios and Chasteen, 2013). We hypothesized that
this processing disﬂuency when perceiving biracial individuals
would be especially pronounced for those with a low genetic
overlap perspective. “Low overlap” perceivers expect diﬀerent
people to be relatively genetically distinct, with a clear thresh-
old where one person or group ends and another begins (Plaks
et al., 2012). The either/or nature of this threshold generally
encourages assimilation of faces into one category or the other
(Eberhardt et al., 2003; Sanchez et al., 2011). We expected, how-
ever, that racially-ambiguous faces would resist easy classiﬁcation,
challenging the assumption of discrete categories. Therefore, we
hypothesized that, compared to individuals who believe in high
genetic overlap, individuals with lower overlap beliefs would
experience greater diﬃculty classifying biracial faces, exhibit
higher levels of neural avoidance toward such faces, and explicitly
evaluate them more negatively. In contrast, because perceivers
with higher overlap beliefs consider racial categories to be com-
paratively indistinct, they should experience less confusion when
they encounter ambiguous faces. Thus, these participants should
be less motivated to avoid or denigrate ambiguous targets.
Our approach extends previous studies that have investigated
how beliefs about race inﬂuence judgments of mono- and bira-
cial targets. For example, Blascovich et al. (1997) found that
participants who were high (vs. low) in anti-Black prejudice
took longer to categorize racially-ambiguous faces. We posit that
genetic overlap beliefs are conceptually and empirically distinct
from anti-Black prejudice (see Plaks et al., 2012). Genetic over-
lap beliefs are descriptive beliefs about all humans, rather than
evaluative stances toward any speciﬁc group. Thus, a person may
sincerely espouse egalitarian ideals, but believe in low genetic
overlap—a position captured by the phrase “separate but equal”
(see Park and Judd, 2005).
Other researchers have focussed more speciﬁcally on the
eﬀects of perceivers’ a priori beliefs on the perception of mono-
and biracial targets. For example, Eberhardt et al. (2003) reported
that participants with an “entity” theory (the belief that traits are
ﬁxed) were more likely than those with an “incremental” theory
(the belief that traits are malleable) to categorize biracial faces as
either Black or White. The present studies seek to extend that
work by uncovering further beliefs about genetics that might, in
fact, provide a basis for assumptions about ﬁxedness/malleability.
Study 1
All studies reported here were approved by the Oﬃce of Research
Ethics at the University of Toronto.
In Study 1, we examined whether genetic overlap beliefs
would inﬂuence neural avoidance by using electroencephalogra-
phy (EEG) to record participants’ neural responses while they
viewed ﬁlms in which faces slowly and continuously morphed
from Black to White. We focused on frontal EEG asymmetry,
which is thought by many to index the motivation to approach or
avoid a given stimulus (Coan and Allen, 2003). Greater relative
left frontal activity has been associated with approach motiva-
tion; greater relative right frontal activity has been associated with
avoidancemotivation (Harmon-Jones andAllen, 1997; Davidson,
1998). We hypothesized that if participants with low overlap
beliefs found racially-ambiguous targets to be perceptually chal-
lenging, they would display a pronounced pattern of greater
relative left frontal activity at the beginning and end of the Black–
White morph videos (when the faces appear monoracial and
racial categorization is easier) but greater relative right frontal
activity toward the middle (when racial ambiguity is maximal).
On the other hand, we did not expect to see this diﬀerence
between the ends vs. the middle of the transitions among partic-
ipants with high overlap beliefs. Speciﬁcally, we were interested
in diﬀerences in neural markers of avoidance when low vs. high
overlap perceivers attend to racially-ambiguous faces.
Method
Participants
Participants were 25 (60% female) undergraduate students (44%
White, 28% East/South East Asian, 12% Middle Eastern, 8%
South Asian, 8% Other).
Materials
Black-white morph videos
We created a series of videos showing faces changing from one
to another using 15 pairs of standardized and normed Black and
White faces of undergraduate-age males (Goﬀ et al., 2008). The
faces were matched on attractiveness rating, head and ear shape,
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head size, and head position. Using these pairs, we created ﬁf-
teen 60-s videos showing faces morphing from a Black face at
0 s to a White face at 60 s. Luminance was held constant by pro-
gressively darkening the background (as the face became lighter).
Sample images taken from one of these videos are displayed in
Figure 1. Creating the facial morphs in this way in this and
the subsequent studies allows for more precise control over the
“mixture” of the biracial faces than is possible with photographs
of real biracial individuals. With facial morphs we can precisely
control the percentage of facial features drawn from each of the
“parent” faces, which is not possible with photographs of real
people.
Procedure
After providing informed consent, participants were connected
to the EEG system. The 15 Black-to-White face morph videos
were presented in random order for 60 s each. Participants
watched the videos passively, without making any responses.
After each video, participants were given the opportunity to take
a short break. The video display and EEG recording were syn-
chronized. Given EEG’s high temporal acuity, we could assess, in
real time, variation in alpha asymmetry as a function of each face’s
racial composition.
Electroencephalography recording was stopped after the video
task and participants were given time to wash their hair. After this
break, participants completed additional, ostensibly unrelated
questionnaires that were said to be provided by other researchers
in the department. Embedded in these measures were two ques-
tions (order counter-balanced) designed to assess genetic-overlap
beliefs:
(1) If you were to choose two people at random from the entire
world, what percentage of genetic material would they have
in common?
(2) If you were to choose two people at random who happened
to be from the same racial background, what percentage of
genetic material would they have in common?
Question “1” has been used in previous research to index
beliefs about genetic overlap between racial groups (Plaks et al.,
2012). This measure has been demonstrated to be empirically dis-
tinct from such potential confounds as political orientation and
Need for Cognition (Plaks et al., 2012)1.
The purpose of Question “2” (about genetic material shared
within racial groups) was to put participants’ responses to
Question “1” into context, allowing us to gain additional detail
regarding how assumptions about overall genetic variation relate
to assumptions about within-group variation in particular. Are
these estimates positively correlated, negatively correlated, or
unrelated? In other words, do people believe that high between-
group diﬀerence implies low within-group diﬀerence (consistent
with research on group homogeneity eﬀects (e.g., Judd et al.,
1991) or do they believe that high between-group diﬀerence also
implies high within-group diﬀerence (consistent with a general
perspective that treats each individual as a distinct biological
entity)?
Next, participants completed a short demographics question-
naire which included a question about political orientation (“In
general, what is your position on political, social, and economic
issues?”; 1 = very liberal. . .6 = very conservative). We included
this item in light of recent ﬁndings indicating that higher con-
servatism predicts a stronger tendency to perceive biracial faces
as Black (Krosch et al., 2013). Finally, participants were fully
debriefed before leaving the lab.
Results
Genetic Overlap Beliefs
As observed in previous research, participants’ responses to the
genetic overlap questions varied widely: Question “1” (general
overlap estimate; M = 71.34%, SD = 32.90%, range: 1–100%);
Question “2” (within-group overlap estimate; M = 84.10%,
SD = 18.87%, range: 40–100%). The correlation between the two
items was positive and high, r = 0.91, p < 0.001.
1In other studies (including Study 2 below), we have included a question that asks
speciﬁcally for an estimate of genetic variation between members of two racial
groups. We have found, however, that this item yields inconclusive results, likely
due to social desirability concerns raised by asking participants to make direct
between-race comparisons. However, we consider the “entire world” question a
plausible proxy for estimates of between-race genetic overlap. Most likely when
people sample two individuals from the entire planet, they generally select people
from distant locations who are of diﬀerent races.
FIGURE 1 | Sample images taken from one of the 60-s videos of faces
morphing from Black to White used in Study 1. Faces changed from Black
at 0 s to White at 60 s; Time windows used for analysis are as indicated. Note
that the start and end faces were matched on attractiveness, ear shape, and
head shape, size, and position and that overall image luminance was held
constant by progressively darkening the background color.
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EEG Recording and Calculating Frontal Asymmetry
Electroencephalography was recorded from 32 Ag/AgCl elec-
trodes in a stretch-lycra cap. Signals were ampliﬁed (60 Hz notch
ﬁlter) and digitized at 560 Hz using ASA acquisition hardware
(Advanced Neuro Technology) with average-ear references and
forehead ground. Impedances were kept below 5 k and fre-
quencies below 1 Hz and above 100 Hz were digitally ﬁltered
(96 dB, zero-phase shift). Movement artifacts were detected with
a −75 and +75 μV threshold. Two second epochs were extracted
through a Hamming window (75% overlap). To examine alpha
asymmetry we used a fast Fourier transform to extract power
within the alpha band (8.00–13.00 Hz). We created three time
windows (0–20 s, “Black”; 20–40 s, “Biracial”; 40–60 s, “White”)
and calculated the relative left vs. right frontal activation asymme-
try as the log of the alpha power at electrode site F4 (right) minus
the log of the alpha power at electrode site F3 (left; Harmon-Jones
and Allen, 1997). Higher (more positive) scores indicate greater
relative left (approach) compared to right (avoidance) activity
(alpha power and cortical activity are inversely related).
In order to examine genetic overlap beliefs continuously, we
followed the recommendations of Van Breukelen and Van Dijk
(2007) and submitted the frontal asymmetry values to a repeated-
measures ANCOVA with time window [time 1 (Black): 0–20 s;
time 2 (Biracial): 20–40 s; time 3 (White): 40–60 s] entered as a
within-subjects variable and responses to the two genetic over-
lap questions (continuous, centered) entered as covariates (see
also Plaks et al., 2012). Time windows are displayed in Figure 1.
The overall mean frontal asymmetry values for each time period
were as follows: time 1 (Black): M = 0.0501, SD = 0.0853;
time 2 (Biracial): M = −0.00767, SD = 0.137; time 3 (White):
M = 0.0458, SD = 0.130.
This analysis revealed a signiﬁcant main eﬀect of time window,
F(2,44) = 6.01, p < 0.01, η2p = 0.21, and signiﬁcant time × esti-
mate interactions for Question “1” (general overlap estimate),
F(2,44) = 3.40, p < 0.05, η2p = 0.13, and Question “2” (within-
group overlap estimate), F(2,44) = 6.61, p < 0.01, η2p = 0.23.
Within-subjects contrasts revealed a signiﬁcant quadratic trend
for both interactions: Question “1”: F(1,22) = 6.37, p < 0.05,
η2p = 0.22; Question “2”: F(1,22) = 12.44, p < 0.01, η2p = 0.362.
To probe these interactions, we regressed the frontal asymme-
try values at each time window onto the genetic overlap estimates.
The results for participants at 1 SD above and below the mean
on the genetic overlap questions are displayed in Figure 2. First,
we examined estimates of general genetic overlap (Question “1”).
At time 2, when the faces were most racially-ambiguous, lower
estimates of genetic overlap between two randomly-selected peo-
ple marginally predicted greater relative right frontal activation
2Conducting this same analysis with political orientation added as a covariate
yielded a similar pattern of results. Controlling for political orientation in this anal-
ysis yielded a signiﬁcant interaction between time and estimates of genetic overlap
shared within racial groups (question “2”: F(2,42) = 4.07, p < 0.05, η2p = 0.16),
but weakened the interaction between time and estimates of genetic overlap shared
between racial groups (Question “1”: F(2,42) = 2.59, p = 0.09, η2p = 0.11. The
quadratic trends for each of the interactions between time and genetic overlap esti-
mates remained signiﬁcant: general overlap estimate Question “1,” F(1,21) = 4.84,
p < 0.05, η2p = 0.19; within-race overlap estimate question “2,” F(1,21) = 7.55,
p = 0.01, η2p = 0.26. No signiﬁcant eﬀect of political orientation was observed,
F < 1.
FIGURE 2 | Mean standardized left vs. right frontal activation observed
while participants viewed 60-s videos of faces morphing from Black to
White [(y > 0 = greater relative left activation (approach); y < 0 =
greater relative right activation (withdrawal)] in Study 1. “High” and
“low” values represent the frontal asymmetry values of participants at 1 SD
above and below the mean on the general and within-race genetic overlap
questions.
(avoidance), β = 0.35, t(23) = 1.80, p= 0.09. At time 1 [β = 0.23,
t(23) = 1.15] and time 3 [β = 0.17, t(23) = 0.84], estimates
of genetic overlap did not signiﬁcantly predict frontal asymme-
try values, ps > 0.25. Thus, as predicted, a general assumption
of clear, genetically-based distinctions between two randomly-
drawn humans elicits a comparatively negative response toward
people who are not readily classiﬁable.
Next, we examined estimates of within-race genetic overlap
(Question “2”). Once again, at time 2, lower estimates of over-
lap predicted more relative right frontal activation (avoidance),
β = 0.42, t(23) = 2.23, p < 0.05. Estimates of genetic overlap
within racial groups did not signiﬁcantly predict frontal asymme-
try values at time 1 [β = 0.09, t(23) = 0.44] or time 3 [β = 0.07,
t(23) = 0.32], ps > 0.65. This pattern suggests that people who
give lower within-group overlap estimates expect individuals to
diﬀer visibly from one another – even when those individuals are
from the same racial group. Visual evidence of a continuous blur
from one individual to another violates the expectation of clear
boundaries between individuals and thus elicits a relative avoid-
ance response. Note that this neural avoidance pattern was no
longer signiﬁcant once the target face clearly belonged to another
person (at time 3).
A priori, it might have been conceivable that high within-
group estimates would predict lower “whole world” estimates
(i.e., more within-group sameness implies greater between-group
diﬀerence). In these data, however, the two estimates were highly,
positively correlated. Moreover, both estimates predicted EEG
responding in a similar fashion. Thus, a general representa-
tion of low genetic overlap mattered more than the within- vs.
between-group distinction.
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We hypothesize that a primary reason why people with low
genetic overlap beliefs are inclined to avoid biracial faces is
because such faces disrupt processing ﬂuency—they are harder
to classify. Study 1, however, contained no measures of process-
ing ﬂuency. Thus, in Study 2, we used a face-classiﬁcation task
to examine whether belief in lower genetic overlap would pre-
dict more diﬃculty in categorizing biracial faces compared to
monoracial faces.
Study 2
Method
Participants and Design
Participants were 449 (47% female, mean age = 48.70,
SD = 13.91) residents of the United States recruited via
Qualtrics Panels in exchange for $4.20 compensation (equiva-
lent to ∼$25/h; 59% White, 5% African American, 4% Latino,
each remaining category including biracial <3%). Participants
were randomly assigned to one of two classiﬁcation conditions
(described below) and all participants saw two types of faces,
resulting in a 2 (classiﬁcation condition: race, control) × 2 (face
type: monoracial, biracial) mixed design.
Materials and Procedure
After providing informed consent, participants completed seven
questions (randomized) to assess beliefs about genetics. Three
questions asked for estimates of genetic variation between two
humans selected from: (1) the entire world, (2) the same race,
and (3) diﬀerent races. Four ﬁnal multiple-choice questions were
included as a quiz of knowledge of genetics (e.g., “The human
genome is made up of how many pairs of chromosomes?” “An
organism’s physical appearance or observable characteristics is
known as its_____.”).
To obfuscate the connection between the genetics questions
and the face classiﬁcation task, participants also completed an
anagram task. Participants were asked to rearrange the letters in
a string of text (e.g., AEMDR) to produce a word (e.g., DREAM),
and were given 120 s to complete as many items as possible.
Participants also completed the classiﬁcation task reported by
Halberstadt andWinkielman (2014; Study 3). Participants viewed
a series of 48 stimulus faces which were presented in the cen-
ter of the screen for 3000 ms, following a 500 ms ﬁxation cross.
Faces were created using 24 photographs of Chinese individuals
and 24 photographs of Caucasian individuals from the University
of Western Australia’s “Facelab” database (see Halberstadt and
Winkielman, 2014). Morphing software was used to blend each
photograph with one same-race photograph and one other-race
photograph to create 48 stimulus photographs: 24 monoracial
faces (12 Chinese morphs and 12 Caucasian morphs), and 24
biracial faces (the Chinese-Caucasian morphs). In other words,
both the monoracial stimuli and biracial stimuli were morphs
created from the faces of two diﬀerent people. This was done
to rule out the potential confound that there are inherent dif-
ferences (e.g., perceived realism) between morphed faces and the
faces of real people, independent of racial composition. Sample
photographs used in this study are displayed in Figure 3.
FIGURE 3 | Sample photographs from Study 2. Stimuli used in this study
included 24 monoracial faces (12 Chinese morphs and 12 Caucasian
morphs), and 24 biracial faces (Chinese-Caucasian morphs). Column
(A): monoracial Chinese; column (B): monoracial Caucasian; column
(C) biracial Chinese-Caucasian.
Participants in the race classiﬁcation condition pressed the
“A” key if the face was Caucasian or the “L” key if the face
was Asian. Those in the control condition pressed the “A” key
if the person was “feeling positive” or the “L” key if the per-
son was “feeling negative” at the time the photograph was taken.
The links between keyboard letters and response options were
counter-balanced between participants. The inclusion of an emo-
tion classiﬁcation condition follows Halberstadt andWinkielman
(2014), who found that people were slower to classify the biracial
faces only in the race classiﬁcation condition.
Faces were presented with an inter-trial interval of 5000 ms. If
reaction times (RTs) exceeded 3000 ms, the program prompted
participants to respond more quickly. Immediately after each
classiﬁcation, participants were asked to rate the attractiveness
of the face just presented (1 = “not attractive”. . .9 = “very
attractive”). Finally, participants completed a short demographics
survey and were fully debriefed.
The overall order of tasks was varied such that the genet-
ics questions occurred before or after the classiﬁcation task, and
these two tasks were always separated by the anagrams task. The
order of the genetics questions and classiﬁcation task were ran-
domized in this way to control for the possibility that responses
on one task might inﬂuence responses on the next task, despite
the interposed anagrams task.
Results
Genetic Overlap Beliefs
As observed in Study 1, participants’ responses to the human
genetic overlap questions varied widely: Question “1” (general
overlap estimate; M = 51.28%, SD = 35.78%, range: 0–100%);
Question “2” (within-group overlap estimate; M = 65.94%,
SD = 30.55%, range: 0–100%); Question “3” (between-group
overlap estimate; M = 53.00, SD = 34.34, range: 0–100%). The
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correlations among the three items were positive and high, all
rs > 0.74, all ps < 0.001.
Reaction Times
Participants with RTs greater than two SDs from the mean
were removed (0.8%). All remaining RTs were log transformed.
Additional participants’ data were removed due to failure to
complete primary dependent measure items (n = 12) or inco-
herent responding (n = 8), resulting in a ﬁnal total of 393
participants.
We examined the eﬀects of genetic overlap beliefs on RTs
to categorize biracial faces compared to monoracial faces with
a repeated-measures full factorial ANCOVA. Face type (mono-
racial vs. biracial) was entered as a within-subjects variable,
classiﬁcation condition [race classiﬁcation vs. emotional (con-
trol) classiﬁcation] was entered as a between-subjects variable,
and responses to the two genetic overlap questions used in Study
1 (“whole world” and “same race”) were entered as covariates
(continuous, centered)3,4. This analysis revealed main eﬀects
for the following: (1) face type, F(1,386) = 16.20, p <0 .001,
η2p = 0.04 (indicating that, overall, participants responded slower
to biracial targets, M = 1602.35 ms, SD = 434.74 ms, than
to monoracial targets, M = 1500.01 ms, SD = 421.37 ms;
(2) Question “1” (general overlap estimate), F(1,386) = 8.19,
p < 0.01, η2p = 0.02; and (3) Question “2” (within-group overlap
estimate), F(1,386) = 5.50, p < 0.02, η2p = 0.01. These latter two
eﬀects indicated that higher estimates of genetic overlap generally
predicted slower RTs.
In addition, the following two-way interactions emerged: (1)
face type × classiﬁcation condition, F(1,386) = 4.99, p < 0.05,
η2p = 0.01, replicating Halberstadt andWinkielman’s (2014) ﬁnd-
ing that it took longer to classify biracial faces according to
race; (2) face type × “whole world” general overlap estimate
(Question “1”), F(1,386) = 11.83, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.03, and (3)
face type × “same race” within-group estimate (Question “2”),
F(1,386) = 7.65, p < 0.01, η2p = 0.02. These latter two interac-
tions indicated that the tendency to respond slower to biracial (vs.
monoracial) faces varied according to one’s belief in genetic over-
lap: the lower one’s genetic overlap estimates, the longer it took to
classify biracial faces.
The analysis also revealed the predicted three-way interactions
for face type × classiﬁcation condition × “whole world” gen-
eral overlap estimate (Question “1”), F(1,386) = 7.28, p < 0.01,
η2p = 0.02 and face type × classiﬁcation condition × “same race”
within-group estimate (Question “2”), F(1,386) = 9.28, p < 0.01,
η2p = 0.02. These interactions indicated that the tendency to
respond slower to biracial faces as a function of belief in genetic
overlap varied according to whether the participant was asked to
classify the target’s race or the target’s emotional state.
To probe these interactions, we conducted analogous
ANCOVAs within each classiﬁcation condition. As expected,
when the participants’ task was to classify the target’s emotional
3Additional analyses that included Question 3 (estimates of genetic overlap
between two people explicitly identiﬁed as belonging to diﬀerent races) did not
yield any signiﬁcant eﬀects and will not be discussed further.
4Including participants’ score on the genetics quiz as a covariate did not alter the
results. Thus, this variable will not be discussed further.
state, genetic overlap beliefs did not inﬂuence RTs, all Fs < 3.30,
all ps > 0.07.
However, when the task was to classify the target’s race, a face
type × “whole world” general overlap estimate (Question “1”)
interaction emerged, F(1,179) = 6.52, p = 0.01, η2p = 0.04, indi-
cating that RTs to biracial vs.monoracial faces varied as a function
of genetic overlap beliefs. More speciﬁcally, the lower the esti-
mate of genetic overlap between two humans selected from the
whole world, the longer it took participants to classify biracial
faces, β = −0.15, t(182) = −2.05, p< 0.05. Thus, consistent with
our hypothesis, belief in lower genetic overlap was associated with
experiencing greater diﬃculty when classifying biracial (but not
monoracial) faces according to their race.
In this analysis, the face type × “same race” within-group
estimate (Question “2”) interaction was no longer signiﬁcant,
β = −0.08, t(182)= −1.09, p> 0.25. Thus, when included simul-
taneously, beliefs about “whole world” genetic overlap appeared
to be the better predictor of RTs to biracial vs. monoracial faces.
Raw RT means and SDs are presented in Table 1.
Additional analyses that included the “diﬀerent race” genetic
overlap question as the predictor variable did not yield any sig-
niﬁcant eﬀects (all ps > 0.25). This is most likely because asking
participants to explicitly compare the genetics of diﬀerent racial
groups activates a host of social desirability concerns, however, we
believe that the “whole world” question may serve as an eﬀective
proxy for the “diﬀerent race” question.
Attractiveness Ratings
We conducted analogous analyses examining the eﬀects of
genetic overlap beliefs on attractiveness ratings of biracial face
morphs compared to monoracial face morphs. Face type (mono-
racial vs. biracial) was entered as a within-subjects variable,
classiﬁcation condition [race classiﬁcation vs. emotional (con-
trol) classiﬁcation] was entered as a between-subjects variable,
and responses to the “whole world” and “same race” genetic over-
lap questions were entered as covariates (continuous, centered).
This analysis revealed no signiﬁcant main eﬀects or interactions,
all Fs < 0.355. In other words, although believers in low genetic
overlap found biracial faces more diﬃcult to categorize, they did
not ﬁnd them less attractive.
In sum, while we acknowledge that the observed eﬀect sizes
are small, Study 2 provides response time evidence that the lower
the belief in genetic overlap between two humans, the greater
the diﬃculty in racially classifying biracial (but not monoracial)
target faces. This supports the notion that the belief in diﬀer-
ent people as genetically distinct entities encourages dichotomous
(vs. continual) racial classiﬁcation (Plaks et al., 2012). Study 2
goes on to suggest that when a target person thwarts easy racial
classiﬁcation, believers in low overlap ﬁnd the task more diﬃcult.
How does this diﬃculty with racial categorization translate
into behavior toward a racially-ambiguous target? Based on Study
1, one answer to this question might be greater avoidance of
biracial (vs. monoracial) targets. It is possible, however, that
5The absence of a face type × classiﬁcation condition interaction, F(1,386) = 0.17,
p > 0.65, represents a failure to replicate Halberstadt and Winkielman’s (2014;
Study 3) ﬁnding. We would note that the present study had 6.34 times as many
participants (N = 393) as Halberstadt and Winkielman’s (N = 63).
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TABLE 1 | Study 2 response times.
Race classification condition Emotional classification condition (Control)
Monoracial target Biracial target Monoracial target Biracial target
“Whole World” estimate
High overlap 1358.65 (351.52) 1578.27 (330.27) 1633.36 (403.21) 1621.93 (449.68)
Low overlap 1465.35 (340.24) 1826.99 (432.63) 1572.54 (441.79) 1586.97 (422.95)
“Same Race” estimate
High overlap 1421.88 (388.92) 1654.74 (405.36) 1614.96 (442.47) 1584.80 (488.47)
Low overlap 1456.56 (340.01) 1709.14 (430.29) 1553.44 (427.29) 1568.44 (488.47)
Mean response times (in milliseconds) to categorize monoracial and biracial target persons as a function of genetic overlap beliefs in Study 2. SDs appear in parentheses.
“High” vs. “Low” Overlap are reported at 1 SD above and below the sample mean.
low overlap participants in Study 1 avoided biracial targets not
because they evaluated them negatively per se, but simply in order
to avoid the feeling of confusion when faced with a diﬃcult cate-
gorization task. Thus, in Study 3 we examined whether the diﬀer-
ences observed in Studies 1 and 2 would translate into explicit
negative evaluations of a biracial target. If so, this would sug-
gest that low overlap believers’ response to biracial targets extends
beyond their own feelings of confusion (“I don’t know how to cat-
egorize this person”) to the actual attribution of negative traits to
the target (“he is disagreeable”).
In Study 3, we also sought to expand the methodologies
employed in Studies 1 and 2 by manipulating beliefs about shared
genetic material. Our attempt to manipulate genetic belief was
motivated by two goals. First, if eﬀects similar to those of Study
1 and 2 were found with manipulated beliefs, this would suggest
that beliefs about genetic overlap help to cause diﬀerent patterns
of race perception. Second, if those randomly assigned to the
high genetic overlap condition were to evaluate biracial individ-
uals less negatively than those in a low genetic overlap condition,
this would have practical implications for prejudice reduction
programs.
Why might one hypothesize that these beliefs can be manipu-
lated? Most people have little intuitive knowledge about genomic
science and few strong convictions about genetic variability.
Thus, both the high and low overlap perspectives may seem
believable to most people. Put diﬀerently, both perspectives may
be cognitively available in long-term memory, but either may
be made more accessible through persuasive primes (e.g., Bargh
et al., 1988). In previous work, researchers have successfully
manipulated general implicit theories of human traits and abil-
ities (e.g., Plaks and Chasteen, 2013, Study 3; Plaks et al., 2009,
Study 3) as well as speciﬁc beliefs about genetic overlap (Plaks
et al., 2012, Study 2). Therefore, Study 3 allowed us both to exam-
ine the manipulability of genetic overlap beliefs and to investigate
their impact on evaluations of racially-ambiguous targets.
Study 3
Method
Participants
Participants were 171 (48% female) residents of the United States
recruited online via Amazon Mechanical Turk in exchange for
$0.50 compensation (79% White, 6% African American, 5%
East/Southeast Asian, 4% Latino, 6% other categories (includ-
ing Paciﬁc Islander, Native American, and biracial). The mean
age was 32.06 (SD = 10.51). The mean political orientation was
1.23 (SD = 2.62) on a scale from -5 (extremely conservative) to
+5 (extremely liberal, a score which corresponded to “slightly
liberal.”
Materials
Genetic Overlap Manipulation
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two genetic over-
lap belief conditions. In the high overlap condition, participants
read an article, ostensibly from “Genomic Scientech,” indicat-
ing that humans share 99.9% of their genetic material. The text
of this article was adapted from an actual article in American
Psychologist (Ossorio and Duster, 2005). The article provided var-
ious forms of genomic evidence that genetic overlap between
humans is high. In the low overlap condition, the article was
kept as similar as possible, but certain words and numbers were
modiﬁed to reﬂect the view that genetic overlap between humans
with ancestry from diﬀerent parts of the world is low (21.4%).
The article suggested that race is a legitimate biogenetic con-
struct and that races can be thought of as similar to extended
families.
Stimuli in the face judgment task were nine grayscale images
of male targets. Six photos of 100% Black and 100%White targets
(three of each race) were drawn from the same normed and stan-
dardized photo set used to create the videos used in Study 1 (Goﬀ
et al., 2008). Three additional photos of 50% Black/50% White
targets were created by digitally combining three Black andWhite
face pairs. Images used in this study were cropped to display only
the targets’ eyes and noses; hair and mouths were not visible (see
Figure 4 for sample stimuli).
Procedure
After providing informed consent, participants began the ﬁrst
of what was described as two separate studies. “Study 1” was
described as a reading comprehension task. The computer ran-
domly presented one of two articles – high genetic overlap or low
genetic overlap. After reading their assigned article, participants
completed a manipulation check item: “In your estimation, if you
drew two people at random from the entire world, what percent-
age of genetic material would they have in common?” Participants
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FIGURE 4 | Sample photographs from Study 3. Stimuli used in this study
included 3 photos of 100% White targets (column A), 3 digitally created
photos of 50% Black/50% White targets (column B), and 3 photos of 100%
Black targets (column C). Images were cropped to display only the targets’
eyes and noses.
selected from ﬁve diﬀerent values ranging from 1 (21.4%) to
5 (99.9%). In addition, participants were asked to describe the
article in their own words.
Next, in “Study 2,” the computer presented the following
instructions: “Research in psychology has begun to show that
people are surprisingly good at making judgments about a per-
son just by looking at their face. We are interested in the accuracy
of people’s facial judgments. We will ask you to make judgments
about diﬀerent people just by looking at their face. In addition, we
will ask you to estimate how conﬁdent you are about your rating.”
Next, participants saw a total of nine faces (three White, three
Black, three Biracial), presented individually in random order.
Participants were asked to rate each face on a randomized series
of positive and negative traits using a 1–7 rating scale (1 = not
at all. . .7 = extremely). The traits were: horrible, aggressive,
dangerous, annoying, mean, crazy, wild, emotional, compassion-
ate, polite, pleasant, nice, trustworthy, kind, calm, and rational.
Participants also indicated how certain they were in their ratings
(1 = extremely uncertain. . .5 = extremely certain).
Next, participants completed a battery of questionnaires,
including demographics, political orientation (one item:
−5 = extremely conservative. . .5 = extremely liberal), and a
measure of the Big Five personality traits [the Big Five Aspects
Scale (BFAS), DeYoung et al., 2007]. A suspicion check item
asked participants to describe in their own words what they
believed the study was about. Finally, participants were guided
through a full debrieﬁng which explained that the text read
during “Study 1” was created for this experiment and not an
actual, scientiﬁc report.
Results
Suspicion and Manipulation Checks
Suspicion check
Two coders rated responses to the suspicion check item on
whether participants guessed that the study concerned the rela-
tionship between beliefs about genetics and perceptions of race.
The coders (who achieved 99% agreement) identiﬁed 19 partic-
ipants who identiﬁed the correct purpose of the study. These
participants wrote statements such as, “This study was about
what people think about genetics and how it aﬀects racism.”
Because knowledge of the hypothesized relationship between
genetic overlap belief and racial perception could contaminate
participants’ responses, these participants were removed from the
analyses.
Genetic belief manipulation check
Of the remaining participants, seven failed the genetic belief
manipulation check by leaving the item blank and six failed by
summarizing the article in a non-sensical fashion. This left a
total of 139 participants, 62 in the high overlap condition and
77 in the low overlap condition. Among these participants, the
manipulation appeared to be successful: high overlap partici-
pants’ estimates of the percentage of genetic material people have
in common (M = 5.0, SD = 0.01, corresponding to a mean esti-
mate of 99.9%)were signiﬁcantly higher than those of low overlap
participants (M = 1.13, SD = 0.62, corresponding to a mean
estimate of 22%), t(1,137) = 49.55, p < 0.001.
Trait Evaluations
A factor analysis of the trait items revealed two signiﬁcant fac-
tors (eigenvalues > 5.0). One factor – which included all items
but “rational” – reﬂected overall valence (positive vs. negative
traits). The second factor included only the traits “dangerous,”
“crazy,” “emotional,” and “horrible.” These four traits (Cronbach’s
α = 0.72), which appeared to cluster speciﬁcally around “primi-
tive” or animal-like concepts, were combined into an evaluation
index, our main dependent measure. To examine the eﬀects
of target race on participants’ evaluations, we conducted a 2
(genetic overlap belief: high vs. low) × 3 (face type: 100% White,
50% White-50% Black, 100% Black) analysis of variance, with
repeated measures on the second factor. This analysis revealed
a signiﬁcant eﬀect for face type, F(2,136) = 16.87, p < 0.001,
η2p = 0.20, indicating that participants did not rate the three
faces equivalently. In addition, the predicted genetic overlap
belief × face type interaction also emerged, F(2,136) = 4.52,
p < 0.05, η2p = 0.06.
As reported in Table 2, participants in the low genetic over-
lap condition rated the biracial targets more negatively on the
four-item “primitivism” index (M = 3.05, SD = 0.69) than did
participants in the high overlap condition (M = 2.78, SD= 0.82),
F(1,137) = 4.33, p < 05, d = 0.35. Low and high overlap par-
ticipants did not diﬀer in their ratings of 100% Black and 100%
White targets (both Fs< 1.0).
Participants in the high overlap condition rated the biracial
target (M = 2.78, SD = 0.82) less negatively on the four-item
index than the 100% Black target (M = 2.95, SD = 0.82),
TABLE 2 | Study 3 evaluations.
100% White 50% White-50% Black 100% Black
High overlap 3.24 (0.86) 2.78 (0.82) 2.95 (0.82)
Low overlap 3.23 (0.80) 3.05 (0.69) 2.93 (0.91)
Mean evaluation ratings (dangerous, crazy, emotional, horrible) of monoracial and
biracial target persons as a function of genetic overlap belief condition in Study 3.
SDs appear in parentheses.
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t(1,137) = 2.18, p < 0.05, d = 0.33. In contrast, participants in
the low overlap condition rated the biracial target (M = 3.05,
SD = 0.69) equivalently to the 100% Black target (M = 2.94,
SD = 0.91), t(1,137) = 1.52, p = 0.13.
Additional analyses that used as the dependent variable an
index of all traits which clustered around a positivity-negativity
dimension did not yield a signiﬁcant genetic overlap belief× face
type interaction, F(2,136) = 1.73, p = 0.18. Thus, it appears that
genetic overlap beliefs were better predictors of participants’ rat-
ings on traits that generally seem more “biological” and thus
more susceptible to genetic inﬂuence. Indeed, these types of traits
(rather than generalized negativity) are precisely those that fea-
ture prominently in stereotypes about the assumed “primitive”
nature of people of African descent (e.g., Goﬀ et al., 2008).
Note that whereas in Study 1 low overlap participants dis-
played more neural signs of avoidance in response to biracial
targets than to Black targets, in the present study, low over-
lap participants’ explicit ratings of the two types of targets were
equivalently negative. This diﬀerence may be due to diﬀerences
between the two paradigms (e.g., general approach/avoidance vs.
speciﬁc trait ratings; implicit vs. explicit measures). However, the
overall pattern is consistent with our primary hypothesis: low
overlap participants rated biracial targets more negatively than
did high overlap participants.
Political orientation
Recent results indicate that political conservatism predicts the
tendency to perceive biracial faces as Black (Krosch et al., 2013).
Might our results be explained by the fact that the low genetic
overlap participants were more conservative? The data do not
support such an explanation. First, we re-conducted the analysis
with political orientation included as a covariate. In this analy-
sis, the genetic overlap belief × face type interaction remained
signiﬁcant, F(2,139) = 3.50, p < 0.05. Second, the fact that
genetic overlap beliefs were manipulated renders an explanation
due to individual diﬀerences in political orientation implau-
sible. Moreover, the belief × face type interaction remained
signiﬁcant when each of the Big Five traits were added as
covariates.
The 100%White targets
As depicted in Table 2, both high and low genetic overlap par-
ticipants rated the 100% White targets signiﬁcantly more nega-
tively than both the biracial and Black targets, all Fs > 3.72, all
ps < 0.05. Why might this be the case? We considered the pos-
sibility that participants may have judged the White faces as less
attractive than the biracial or Black faces. However, a pilot study
(N = 147) indicated no signiﬁcant eﬀect of face race on ratings of
attractiveness, F(2,147)= 0.55, p= 0.58. Another possibility may
have to do with self-presentational concerns. Future researchers
may consider examining whether, for example, extrinsic moti-
vation to respond without prejudice (Plant and Devine, 1998)
predicts ratings of White targets relative to Black or Biracial
targets.
Nonetheless, this pattern does not contradict our hypothesis
that the eﬀects of genetic overlap beliefs would be primarily evi-
dent with biracial targets. This was the case across all studies.
Whereas in Study 1 the diﬀerence between low and high overlap
participants in negativity toward biracial targets was expressed
in autonomic neural reactions, in Study 3 this diﬀerence was
expressed in explicit ratings of the target’s negative traits. Note
that in Study 2, genetic overlap beliefs did not aﬀect partici-
pants’ ratings of biracial targets’ attractiveness. Thus, low overlap
participants’ avoidance response in Study 1 and negative trait rat-
ings in Study 3 do not appear to be related to their perceptions
of the targets’ physical attractiveness. Instead, based on Study
3’s data, it appears that low overlap participants are more likely
to ascribe negative, underlying (invisible) personal qualities to
biracial people.
Discussion
These studies – drawing on both undergraduate and commu-
nity samples – represent, to our knowledge, the ﬁrst evidence
that how laypeople mentally quantify the genetic aspect of race
is an important predictor of approach and avoidance reactions to
biracial targets. Whereas previous researchers have examined the
eﬀects of, for example, essentialist beliefs (Chao et al., 2013) and
beliefs regarding nature vs. nurture (No et al., 2008; Williams and
Eberhardt, 2008) on stereotyping-related processes, the present
work goes an important step further by beginning to specify how
people mentally quantify “nature,” and how this, in turn, relates
to evaluative and approach/avoidance tendencies toward racially-
ambiguous individuals. In Study 1, individuals who believed in
lower (vs. higher) genetic overlap showed higher levels of neu-
ral avoidance from biracial individuals. In Study 2, individuals
who believed in lower (vs. higher) genetic overlap took longer
to classify biracial (vs. monoracial) targets, suggesting that they
experienced greater diﬃculty. In Study 3, low overlap partici-
pants explicitly rated biracial targets more negatively than did
high overlap participants. In addition, the Study 3 ﬁnding that
randomly manipulated genetic overlap beliefs yielded results that
were in line with the continuous, individual diﬀerence variable
suggests that these beliefs play an important role in causing dif-
ferent patterns of evaluation of biracial targets. As such, these
ﬁndings shed light on a unique source of bias against biracial peo-
ple, who tend to be racially-ambiguous, and constitute one of the
fastest growing minority groups in the United States (Townsend
et al., 2009).
These data suggest that a mental model of high genetic dis-
tinctiveness creates an expectancy of low racial ambiguity. That
is, if individuals are clearly distinct from one another at the
genetic level, they should be easy to categorize. An ambiguous
person violates this expectancy, which, in turn, appears to elicit a
negative response.
In both Study 1 and Study 2, we found that a belief in low
genetic overlap predicted parallel results, regardless of whether
the question was about people drawn at random from the whole
world or people from the same race. It was conceivable a priori
that the two genetic overlap questions (general vs. within-group)
would be inversely correlated (i.e., the more similar group mem-
bers are to each other, the more diﬀerent they are from members
of other groups). The data clearly indicated otherwise: the two
genetic overlap questions were highly, positively correlated, and
both yielded similar results. Thus, it appears that people with a
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low within-group overlap perspective expect even members of
the same group to possess considerable genetic diﬀerence. The
greater the assumed diﬀerence, the greater the avoidance of a face
that blurs the distinction between the race of one person and
the next. Taking both estimates together, the Study 1 data sug-
gest that a generalized expectation of low genetic overlap leads
perceivers to view ambiguous or diﬃcult-to-classify individuals
negatively.
One limitation of the current studies is that our experi-
mental designs and participant samples make it impossible for
us to examine the eﬀects of participant race on genetic over-
lap estimates and perceptions. When we asked participants to
provide genetic overlap estimates (Studies 1 and 2), or when
we manipulated them in a general way without naming a spe-
ciﬁc group (Study 3), we have no way of knowing what groups
participants have in mind when making judgments. In future
research it would be helpful to examine variability in estimates
depending on which racial groups participants are asked to think
about. Participants may, for example, estimate higher overlap
between their racial group and some out-groups, but lower over-
lap between their racial group and others. These estimates may
vary based on the relative status of the out-group in question,
or perhaps even on group-esteem. For example, individuals with
high racial-group-esteem may perceive more overlap with high-
status groups, whereas those with low group-esteemmay perceive
less overlap with high-status groups. Even when considering only
racial out-groups, people likely perceive some groups as more
similar and others as less similar (e.g., perhaps based on similar
phenotypic features or geographic proximity). All of this vari-
ation may have important implications for attitudes about and
interaction with members of racial in- and out-groups. Further,
future researchwhich speciﬁcally recruits large and equal samples
of speciﬁc racial groups could shed more light on whether peo-
ple draw on genetic overlap estimates diﬀerently when thinking
about members of their own racial groups vs. members of racial
out-groups.
Throughout this paper, we have argued that a belief in low
genetic overlap is associated with a variety of negative reactions
to biracial individuals. In future research it will be important
to investigate more systematically how diﬀerences in scientiﬁc
literacy or even general IQ factor into how people respond to
questions about genetic overlap. People who respond with lower
estimates are more out of step with the scientiﬁc data, suggest-
ing lower scientiﬁc or genetic literacy. More generally, scholars
have long posited a negative relationship between cognitive abil-
ity and prejudice (e.g., Adorno et al., 1950; Allport, 1954; Kutner
and Gordon, 1964; Hodson and Busseri, 2012), and there has
been a recent call for further examination of this relationship and
its possible underlying mechanisms (Dhont and Hodson, 2014;
Hodson, 2014).
In addition, future researchers should investigate which exact
emotions are associated with the negative responses suggested by
these studies (e.g., fear, disgust), as well as examine the impact
of other types of genetic beliefs such as, for example, the amount
of genetic overlap between men and women, normal weight and
obese individuals, or individuals from diﬀerent socioeconomic
backgrounds. Finally, future studies should also capitalize on the
ﬁnding in Study 3 that genetic beliefs can be manipulated as an
avenue for prejudice-reduction interventions (see also Plaks et al.,
2012, Study 2). Teaching basic principles of human genetics could
prove to be a simple, inexpensive, and powerful way to reduce
racial bias.
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